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NOTES
ENFORCING  A  WALL  OF  SEPARATION  BETWEEN
BIG  BUSINESS  AND  STATE:  PROTECTION




In 2016, New York Times columnist Farhad Manjoo dubbed Amazon,
Apple, Alphabet (the parent company of Google), Facebook, and Microsoft
the “Frightful Five.”1  Since then, Americans’ fear of monopoly has only
grown.  Headlines ask, “Should you be scared of Amazon?” (the answer,
according to the author, is yes).2  Academics have been celebrated for devel-
oping policies to tackle the problem of powerful companies that consumers
generally like.3  The 2020 Democratic presidential candidates tried to ride
the antimonopoly wave.  Senator Elizabeth Warren released a comprehensive
plan to break up big tech.4  Senator Bernie Sanders went even further—
when asked if he would consider jailing CEOs who worked to restrict trade,
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2021; Bachelor of Science in
Economics and Mathematics, Hillsdale College, 2018.  I would like to thank Paul Avelar at
the Institute for Justice and Professor Rick Garnett for their valuable guidance and support
in writing this Note.  I would also like to thank my colleagues on the Notre Dame Law Review
for their diligent edits.  Finally, thank you to my wonderful parents for their
encouragement, support, and (nearly) endless patience.  All errors are my own.
1 Farhad Manjoo, Tech’s ‘Frightful 5’ Will Dominate Digital Life for the Foreseeable Future,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/21/technology/techs-
frightful-5-will-dominate-digital-life-for-foreseeable-future.html.
2 Steve Kovach, Should You Be Scared of Amazon?, BUS. INSIDER (June 18, 2017), https:/
/www.businessinsider.com/should-you-be-scared-of-amazon-2017-6.
3 See, e.g., David Streitfeld, Amazon’s Antitrust Antagonist Has a Breakthrough Idea, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/technology/monopoly-anti
trust-lina-khan-amazon.html?smtyp=cur&smid=tw-nytimesbits.
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Sanders commented, “[d]amn right they should be [in jail].”5  In the midst
of the coronavirus pandemic, the House Subcommittee on Antitrust, Com-
mercial, and Administrative Law virtually grilled tech executives and prom-
ised an end to their market power.6
Yet despite the monopoly-phobia that has captivated economic debate,
few Americans think twice about the monopolies in their own backyards.
Across the country, there are thousands of small-scale monopolies with the
same attributes that the dreaded Silicon Valley giants supposedly have: the
power to keep out competitors, raise prices, and mistreat customers.  Take,
for example, the story of Rafael Lopez, a restaurant owner in San Antonio,
Texas.7  Lopez wanted to open a second location that included a food truck
and outdoor seating, but according to city law he had to get every brick-and-
mortar competitor nearby to sign off.8  Or consider the case of six-year-old
Kyler Truesdell, who had to wait two hours for an ambulance in Kentucky.9
Kyler’s cousin Hannah Howe runs an ambulance service a few minutes away
in Ohio, but is unable to operate in Kentucky because she was denied the
right to legally operate in the state.10  Howe’s application was rejected—
despite a declared ambulance shortage—when incumbent operators
protested.11
If Google and the federal government openly teamed up to keep out
competitors, it would be a national scandal.  Yet when city hall joins forces
with established restaurants, barber shops, optometrists, or even florists, the
outrage is rather dull.  There is reason, however, for those who fear private
monopolies to question state-backed barriers to entry with equal force.  Both
the Obama and Trump administrations have complained that occupational
licensing stalls economic growth, raises prices, and increases unemploy-
ment.12  Yet beyond economic woes, allowing the state to pick economic win-
ners is fundamentally contrary to the American scheme of government.  Like
how progressives have conflated the growth of private monopolies with the
5 Ryan Grim, Bernie Sanders Vows to Revive Criminal Prosecutions of CEOs for Unfair Trade
Practices, INTERCEPT (Oct. 23, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/10/23/bernie-sand-
ers-sherman-antitrust-act-monopolies/.
6 See Bobby Allyn & Shannon Bond, 4 Key Takeaways from Washington’s Big Tech Hearing
on ‘Monopoly Power’, NPR (July 30, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/30/896952403/4-
key-takeaways-from-washingtons-big-tech-hearing-on-monopoly-power.
7 San Antonio Food Trucks, INST. FOR JUST., https://ij.org/case/san-antonio-vending/
(last visited Oct. 10, 2020).
8 Id. Due to legal pressure from the Institute for Justice, the City has reformed its
burdensome food truck ordinance. Id.





12 See Adam Thierer & Trace Mitchell, Opinion, Occupational Licensing Reform Is Not a
Partisan Issue, WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/
opinion/op-eds/occupational-licensing-reform-is-not-a-partisan-issue.
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destruction of the American ideal of equality under the law,13 so too does a
state-granted monopoly fly in the face of this principle.
The goal of this Note is not to convince the reader to care more about
regulatory monopolies than private ones.  In fact, it is not to talk about pri-
vate antitrust law at all.  Instead, the goal is to put today’s concern with
monopolies in historical perspective.  Part I traces the history of the
antimonopoly spirit in the United States starting with the English tradition
that was highly influential on the Founders.  This Note then demonstrates
that today’s concern with private monopolies comes from a shift that took
place during the progressive era.  In Part II, this Note highlights the role
state constitutional claims can have in protecting rights, as explained by Jus-
tice William Brennan.  Finally, in Part III, this Note provides a blueprint for
how state antimonopoly provisions may be used to target state-created
monopolies in practice and reclaim America’s Founding antimonopoly spirit.
I. MONOPOLIES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
This Part briefly outlines the history of American antimonopoly senti-
ment, which originated in England and was brought to the colonies.  This
spirit is relevant because it informed many of the state antimonopoly provi-
sions that are the focus of this Note.  Furthermore, it is important to recog-
nize that the progressive focus on private antitrust law was an ideological
shift.  In order to reclaim the Founders’ antimonopoly spirit to combat crony
capitalism today, it is important to realize the historical trajectory.
A. The English Tradition
The American antimonopoly spirit dates back to seventeenth-century
England.  According to Professors Calabresi and Leibowitz, two events during
this century mark the first displays of public outrage over government-
granted monopolies.14  The first was the English common-law case Darcy v.
Allen—famously called The Case of Monopolies.15  During the reign of Queen
Elizabeth I, the Queen frequently sold royal monopolies as a way to raise
revenue.16  In the case, Edward Darcy brought suit, claiming that haber-
dasher Thomas Allen infringed on his royal monopoly right to import and
sell all trading cards in England.17  The court invalidated the monopoly, not
because monopolies were per se invalid, but because this type of monopoly
had never been granted by the Queen before.18  A monopoly in playing
13 See, e.g., TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 30
(2018).
14 Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the Constitution: A History
of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 989 (2013).
15 Id. (citing The Case of Monopolies (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (Q.B.)).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 991–92; William L. Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21
U. CHI. L. REV. 355, 363 (1954).
18 See Letwin, supra note 17, at 363.
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cards was, according to the court, contrary to the common law as it “violated
the right of others to carry on their trade.”19  Furthermore, in his report on
the case, influential seventeenth-century lawyer Edward Coke explained that
the problem of the monopoly was that it hurt those who did not obtain an
exclusive grant and “now will of necessity be constrained to live in idleness
and beggary.”20  Coke’s critique hinged on the monopoly infringing on a
common right possessed by the other card sellers—this understanding was
later adopted by many states in interpreting their antimonopoly provisions.21
The Queen died the year Darcy was decided and her successor, King
James I, continued her practice of selling monopolies to pad the royal
budget—leading to the second case of outrage over monopoly: a power
struggle between the King, Parliament, and the courts.22  The King fired
Coke, then the Lord Chief Justice of England, for ruling against him in
monopoly cases23 and dissolved Parliament in the fight as well.24  Finally, in
1624 the Statue of Monopolies was passed in Parliament, with the help of Lord
Coke who joined Parliament after he was booted from the bench.25  The
statute was surprisingly broad in scope with Section One stating: “[A]ll
monopolies . . . are altogether contrary to the laws of this realm, and so are
and shall be utterly void and of none effect, and in no wise to be put in u[s]e
or execution.”26  While Lord Coke wrote the statute, it was mostly intended
as a check on the King—Parliament could still grant monopolies as it saw
fit.27  In fact, Parliament later granted Darcy his exclusive right to playing
cards.28
B. The Rise and Fall of the American Antimonopoly Spirit
Ironically, the original thirteen colonies inherited the English antimono-
poly sentiment despite being an outgrowth of the crown’s ability to grant
royal charters in the colonies.29  Lord Coke’s influence is especially notewor-
thy with his works being cited to oppose tyrannical actions by the crown.30
Coke’s writings were “standard” reading in America and studied by “John
19 Id.
20 Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 993 (quoting The Case of Monopolies, 77 Eng.
Rep. at 1263).
21 See Part III infra.
22 Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 994–95.
23 For a discussion of Lord Coke’s rulings in influential monopoly cases, see TIMOTHY
SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING: ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND THE LAW 18–23 (2010).
24 Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 995, 997.
25 Id. at 997–98.
26 Id. at 999 (quoting Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 1 (Eng.) (altera-
tions in original) (emphasis omitted)).
27 Barbara Malament, The “Economic Liberalism” of Sir Edward Coke, 76 YALE L.J. 1321,
1351 (1967).
28 Id. at 1351 n.169.
29 Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 1004–05.
30 Id. at 1005–06.
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Adams, John Marshall, James Wilson, and Thomas Jefferson.”31  Additionally,
some colonies adopted their own version of the Statute of Monopolies32—pre-
cursors to the antimonopoly provisions discussed in Part III.
The colonial concern with monopolies is evident in the writings of James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson.  During the debate over ratification, Jeffer-
son wrote to Madison expressing his desire that the Constitution include a
Bill of Rights which would include “restriction against monopolies.”33
Madison responded with a recognition that monopolies were contrary to free
government but “[w]here the power, as with us, is in the many not in the few,
the danger can not be very great that the few will be thus favored.”34
While Jefferson did not get his wish, many scholars point to the Supreme
Court’s early Contracts Clause jurisprudence as evidence of an “antimono-
poly principle” retained in the Constitution.35  In Trustees of Dartmouth College
v. Woodward,36 for example, the Court held that the College’s corporate char-
ter—granted by King George III—was a contract between the state and the
owners so the charter could not be altered without the owner’s consent
under the Contracts Clause.37  Thus, corporations “were no longer mere gov-
ernment privileges; they were private property that the government had to
respect.”38  The holding in Woodward empowered the growth of private cor-
porations that “were no longer viewed as the monopoly recipients of special
governmental grants of privilege.”39  Private corporations, unlike royal char-
ters, could not be granted and rescinded at the state’s whim.40
In some ways, the legal detachment of corporations from the state can
be blamed for the eventual abandonment of the Founders’ antimonopoly
sentiment.  Scholar Timothy Sandefur explains that with the proliferation of
private corporations and rapid industrialization, many Americans abandoned
the free-labor ideology of Jacksonian democracy and instead called for a
guarantee of economic opportunity from the government.41  A reaction to
the “growing influence and power of Standard Oil and other corporations,”
for example, led to the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.42
Additionally, liberal state incorporation laws led to crony capitalism and
abuses.  The railroad monopolies of the late-1800s were especially despised
31 SANDEFUR, supra note 23, at 21.
32 Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 1008.
33 To James Madison from Thomas Jefferson, 20 December 1787, NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS
ONLINE (Thomas Jefferson), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-10-
02-0210 (last visited Nov. 6, 2020).
34 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 1 THE
FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION 477, 478 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1986).
35 Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 1019.
36 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
37 Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 1019.
38 SANDEFUR, supra note 23, at 29.
39 Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 1020.
40 Id.
41 SANDEFUR, supra note 23, at 44–45.
42 Id. at 45.
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for corruption.43  The Camden and Amboy Railroad of New Jersey, for exam-
ple, was granted a monopoly on transit through New Jersey in exchange for
railroad stock.44  The intellectual movements that grew out of this period
opposed “monopolies in general. . . .  These groups feared that these trusts
threatened liberty because they would corrupt politicians by seeking special
benefits and government monopoly privileges.”45  Once it was realized that
big businesses were more effective at obtaining grants of special privilege,
many determined that they should be opposed on principle—even when
operating without special privilege.  In time, the size of corporations was seen
as a harm in and of itself, with Theodore Roosevelt writing in 1913 that “of all
forms of tyranny, the least attractive and the most vulgar is the tyranny of
mere wealth, the tyranny of a plutocracy.”46  Corporations themselves, rather
than the power of the state which they may try to harness, became the mod-
ern progressive’s enemy.
Today, progressive intellectuals claim that their theory is a rebirth of
Founding-era concerns for equality.  In his book, Columbia Law Professor
Tim Wu argues that the “American tradition had . . . been defined by resis-
tance to centralized power and monopoly.”47  According to these intellectu-
als, the American entrepreneurial spirit and rebellion against monopoly can
be traced from the Boston Tea Party, to Thomas Jefferson, to Teddy
Roosevelt.48  The growth of big business was then a rejection of the funda-
mental American principle of equality.49  In a way, Wu and his followers are
correct.50  Yet modern progressives fail to recognize that the true evil the
Founders feared was government-granted monopolies, not big private
companies.
43 Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 1057.
44 Id. at 1058.
45 Id. at 1062.
46 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 464 (1913).  In a 2000 speech, Ralph
Nader credited Justice Brandeis as writing something similar—“[i]n 1941, Supreme Court
Justice Louis Brandeis made a prescient observation when he wrote: ‘We can have a demo-
cratic society or we can have the concentration of great wealth in the hands of a few.  We
cannot have both’”—although it is unclear Justice Brandeis ever said this.  Peter Scott
Campbell, Democracy v. Concentrated Wealth: In Search of a Louis D. Brandeis Quote, 16 GREEN
BAG 2D 251, 251 (2013) (quoting Ralph Nader, Acceptance Statement for the Green Par-
ties’ Nomination for President of the United States (June 25, 2000)).  Even if a misquote, it
has been often repeated, id., potentially demonstrating the intellectual trajectory from the
progressive era to today’s distrust of big business.
47 WU, supra note 13, at 29.
48 David Leonhardt, Opinion, The Monopolization of America, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/25/opinion/monopolies-in-the-us.html.
49 WU, supra note 13, at 30.
50 See also Leonhardt, supra note 48 (arguing that “[t]he Monopolization of America”
must be fought with “another political movement, one that borrows from the Boston Tea
Partiers, Jefferson, T.R. and the other defenders of the economic little guy”).
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II. A POTENTIAL SOLUTION FROM JUSTICE BRENNAN, AN UNLIKELY ADVOCATE
FOR ECONOMIC LIBERTY
Despite the traditional fear of monopoly power framed in Part I, almost
all federal challenges to state-granted monopolies, under both the Constitu-
tion and antitrust law, have been foreclosed by the Supreme Court.51  This is
unlikely to change anytime soon—the lack of protection for economic liberty
under the Constitution is one area where both liberals and conservatives
agree.  In his well-known dissent in Lochner, an infamous case where the
Supreme Court protected economic liberty under a theory of freedom of
contract, progressive Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that the “consti-
tution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez
faire.”52  Following in the footsteps of Holmes, Justice Scalia went so far as to
say that “if the basic law[ ] so permits, the legislature may decide to replace
the free market with central planning.”53
At the same time as the Supreme Court declared that economic liberty
was not a protected interest, the Court expanded individual rights beyond
what had typically been offered in state courts.54  “Even the most progressive
state courts” could not keep up with the Warren Court.55  Yet with the
replacement of Justice Warren with Justice Burger, the Supreme Court
greatly slowed in its creation of new federal civil rights.56  Interestingly, while
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. had been an influential member of the Warren
Court and pushed for expanded federal civil liberties, he began to push for
“relief by another name: a state constitution”—largely in response to the
reduction in civil rights victories at the Supreme Court.57  Justice Brennan
called for states to embrace their role as “a font of individual liberties. . . .
The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not be
allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law—for without
it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.”58
51 See Michael Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785, 786–89 (1982).
52 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  While
Holmes dissented in Lochner, his theory eventually won out, with the Supreme Court since
adopting a deferential, rational basis test for economic regulations. See United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
53 Josh Blackman, Scalia on the Judiciary and Economic Liberty, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG
(May 31, 2013), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2013/05/31/scalia-on-the-judiciary-and-
economic-liberty/ (transcribing Antonin Scalia, Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Address at
Istituto Bruno Leoni (May 27, 2013) (recording available via link in blog post)).
54 JEFFERY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 14 (2018)
55 Id. at 15.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 175.
58 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
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Brennan’s influential law review article marked the start of what many
call the “New Judicial Federalism”—a return to state courts for constitutional
issues in response to the Supreme Court’s shortcomings.59  The Justice later
claimed that state courts heeded his call, citing 250 unpublished state court
opinions which held that the state constitution had a more stringent require-
ment than federal law.60  Yet many state courts, perhaps in response to their
perception of overreach in the Warren Court, instead adopted the holdings
of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.61  Further, instead of taking up Bren-
nan’s call, state courts oftentimes engage in what has been called “kneejerk
lockstepping” and simply apply the federal rule for similar state constitu-
tional provisions.62  Little attention has been paid, however, to an area of
true state independence: state constitutional provisions without a federal
counterpart.  While Justice Brennan likely would not have approved of state
constitutions invalidating economic regulations, his theory cannot be applied
only to favored liberties.
III. STATE ANTIMONOPOLY PROVISIONS
The goal of this Part is to present an avenue for Justice Brennan’s judi-
cial federalism: state antimonopoly provisions.  Twenty-one states specifically
reference monopolies in their state constitutions,63 a protection that is lack-
ing entirely from the federal Constitution.  This Note focuses on nine
states—Maryland, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Arkansas, Georgia,
Wyoming, Oklahoma, and Ohio—which are written to prohibit state-granted
monopolies.64  Unlike New Deal–era state amendments, which were written
to give the states trust-busting power, these amendments are written to pre-
vent crony capitalism.65  The focus on just these few provisions is not meant
to suggest that the remaining states lack a remedy against government-
granted monopolies.  Rather, there is great overlap between explicit monop-
59 Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court “Revolution,” 74 JUDICATURE
190, 190 (1991).
60 William J. Brennan, Jr, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions
as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986).
61 Latzer, supra note 59, at 190.
62 Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case
Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1505–06 (2005).
63 See Steven Gow Calabresi, James Lindgren, Hannah M. Begley, Kathryn L. Dore &
Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions in 2018: What Rights Are Deeply
Rooted in a Modern-Day Consensus of the States?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 49, 106 (2018).
64 These states were pulled from the list of twenty-one states compiled by Calabresi et
al. with wording specifically written to target state-granted monopolies rather than private
monopolies. See id.
65 It is worth noting that two of these New Deal–style amendments have been inter-
preted by their state courts to protect against government-granted monopolies as well. See
Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 1084 & n.632 (discussing applications of the South
Dakota and New Mexico antimonopoly provisions).
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oly provisions and provisions which ban so-called special laws or the granting
of privileges that are not available to all citizens equally.66
A. Maryland (1776)
That monopolies are odious, contrary to the spirit of a free government and the princi-
ples of commerce, and ought not to be suffered.67
Maryland was the first state to adopt an antimonopoly amendment as
part of its state constitution.68  Even before the state constitution was written
in 1776, “[a]s early as 1648 The General Lawes and Libertyes of Massachusetts
provided that ‘there shall be no Monopolies granted or allowed amongst
us.’”69  The origin of this provision is unclear.  Some scholars argue that the
amendment is taken from English common law and Lord Coke’s commenta-
ries.70  Others, however, argue that the amendment was written to express a
general principle for equality or in reaction to the monopolistic British Navi-
gation Acts.71
In one of the first cases under the Maryland antimonopoly provision,
Section 41, the Maryland Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, seemed
to apply Lord Coke’s traditional definition of monopoly.  In Broadway & L.P.
Ferry Co. v. Hankey, the court upheld an exclusive grant to one person to use
the end of the wharf for ferry purposes.72  While not explicitly invoking
Coke, the court made clear that the wharf was under “the dominion of the
State over it” because “the wharf in question is a public highway.”73  Then,
the grant to the appellant was not of a common right.  The court, however,
also couched its reasoning in terms of the public interest, holding that the
grant “is not a monopoly in any sense; but a privilege conferred on the com-
pany to be exercised for the public benefit; such a grant by this Legislature
has never been considered as creating a monopoly, and no authority has
been cited which sustains such a proposition.”74  Thus, from the beginning,
the Section 41 prohibition has been limited by the legislature’s determina-
tion that it was acting in the public good.  From this early case, one can
66 See Calabresi et al., supra note 63, at 105–09.
67 MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. XLI.  This amendment has retained the
same language since 1776.  Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 1073.
68 Compare Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 1073 (“The first states to ban
monopolies in their state constitutions were Maryland and North Carolina.”), with Joshua
C. Tate, Perpetuities and the Genius of a Free State, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1823, 1831–32 (2014).
The Maryland provision was ratified on November 3, 1776, while the drafting committee of
the North Carolina Constitution was not appointed until November 13, 1776. Id.
69 JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HIS-
TORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 22 (3d ed. 2008).
70 DAN FRIEDMAN, THE MARYLAND STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 305 n.257
(G. Alan Tarr ed. 2006).
71 Id.
72 31 Md. 346, 349–50 (1869).
73 Id. at 349.
74 Id.
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already summarize the general exceptions to the prohibition on monopolies
under Section 41: (1) the monopoly is reasonably required for the public
good; (2) the monopoly is in exchange for a public service; and (3) the
monopoly grant was not a common right.75
In almost every case under Section 41 since Broadway, Maryland courts
have relied heavily upon Supreme Court precedent and federal antitrust law
to guide its reasoning.76  In Wright v. State, for example, the court held that a
prohibition on butter substitutes did not create a monopoly because it
applied equally to all producers.77  The Maryland Supreme Court quoted the
U.S. Supreme Court for Lord Coke’s definition of a monopoly.78  Then,
[t]o constitute a monopoly within the meaning of this definition, there must
be an allowance or grant by the state to one or several of a sole right; that is,
a right to the exclusion of all others than the grantee or grantees.  Here is a
grant to none, but a prohibition to all; and, if this statute is to be struck
down, it cannot be done in the name of monopoly.79
This showcases a weakness in Lord Coke’s definition of monopoly: while his
definition protects against the power of the state being used to support a
direct competitor within an industry, it does not necessarily protect against
the power of the state favoring an entire industry at the expense of another.80
Yet the prohibition on butter substitutes surely creates a monopoly in but-
ter—an elimination of competition in substitute products—with all the
attendant harms of monopoly, such as an increase in prices and decrease in
quality.
The continued reliance on federal antitrust law has resulted in confused
Section 41 jurisprudence.  Scholars have previously noted that “[u]ncertainty
as to the scope of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies has lim-
ited its effectiveness.”81  The Maryland Court of Appeals analyzed a hospital
75 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 70, at 46.
76 This is further demonstrated in Goldsmith, where the Maryland Court of Appeals
upheld a fair trade law—a statute which allows minimum prices on resale of trademarked
products—by almost entirely relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning concerning a
fair trade law challenged under Sherman.  Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson & Co., 7 A.2d 176
(Md. 1939) (citing Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183
(1936)).  See infra notes 116–18 and accompanying text for the North Carolina Supreme
Court’s treatment of a similar law.  While the North Carolina Supreme Court also dis-
cussed the Sherman Antitrust Act, the court’s holding was entirely dependent on North
Carolina law.
77 41 A. 795, 798 (Md. 1898).
78 Id. (quoting United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1895)).
79 Id.; see also Supermarkets Gen. Corp. v. State, 409 A.2d 250, 251–52, 258 (Md. 1979)
(holding that Sunday closing laws did not create a monopoly because the law applied uni-
formly despite the fact that the law had numerous exceptions for certain businesses like
drug stores and bakeries).
80 This is in comparison with a line of North Carolina cases which prevent an industry
from being favored but allow state-granted monopolies within the industry. See infra note
131 and accompanying text.
81 William L. Reynolds II & James D. Wright, A Practitioner’s Guide to the Maryland Anti-
trust Act, 36 MD. L. REV. 323, 324 (1976) (footnote omitted).
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medical board employment decision under Section 41 and the Sherman
Antitrust Act in 1946.82  While the decision did not implicate the provision,
the court did not indicate that the rules and regulations of the medical board
could never violate Section 41.83  Since then, the court has been uncertain
about whether Section 41 applies to conduct that does not fall within Lord
Coke’s traditional definition of a monopoly as an exclusive grant from the
sovereign.  In a 1970 case, for example, the court noted that “[t]here seems
to be some question as to whether its ban extends to anything other than
monopolies in the strict sense, that is, an exclusive right or privilege granted
by the sovereign.  We do not resolve that question here.”84
The confusion over Section 41 may also arise from the Court of Appeals’
most clear statement of the definition of monopoly, given in Raney v. Mont-
gomery County Commissioners, in which the court determined that a broad defi-
nition of monopoly was proper because the Maryland constitution provides
“no express protection against special and oppressive privilege.”85  Thus, the
court determined that monopoly “was more often used to describe a condi-
tion which resulted from an exclusive privilege to engage in such commerce,
but, it has long had a broader meaning . . . that of the exclusive possession or
control of something.”86  Nevertheless, the court gave a typical explanation
of when Section 41 prohibits state action—incorporating Lord Coke’s defini-
tion and the public interest: a monopoly is invalid “unless it clearly appears
that it is as to some matter not of common right, or . . . is in furtherance of
the public welfare.”87
In Raney, the court invalidated a law which required government notices
be published in newspapers regarded as Montgomery County newspapers as
long as the typesetting has taken place in the county for the past four years
and paid for by the county.88  The court determined that “it is apparent from
an examination of the statute under consideration that its purpose was not in
any way to promote the public welfare, or to serve any public purpose, but to
grant a monopoly of the public advertising authorized by officials of Mont-
gomery county.”89  Thus, because the regulation was wholly unreasonable, it
was invalid.
While Raney is technically the only instance where a court has invali-
dated a statute for creating a monopoly in violation of Section 41, two early
cases, like Raney, concern geographic restrictions which favor businesses in
one area over another.  In both cases, the court claimed that the classifica-
82 Levin v. Sinai Hosp. of Balt. City, 46 A.2d 298, 300 (Md. 1946).
83 See id. at 302–03.
84 Grempler v. Multiple Listing Bureau of Harford Cnty. Inc., 266 A.2d 1, 3–4 (Md.
1970) (footnote omitted); see also Supermarkets Gen. Corp., 409 A.2d at 258 (noting the ques-
tion over the scope of Section 41, declining to clarify, but determining that the provision
certainly did not apply to Sunday closing laws).
85 183 A. 548, 551 (Md. 1936).
86 Id.at 551–52.
87 Id. at 553.
88 Id. at 549–50, 554.
89 Id. at 553.
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tion was not in the public interest, intended to create a monopoly, and was
invalid without citing the antimonopoly provision.90  In Mercer, the court
invalidated a law that required auctioneer licenses for out-of-county or out-of-
state residents only91 and in Johnson, the court found that a taxi ordinance
which limited business area and applied only to out-of-city residents was
unreasonable and intended to create a monopoly rather than serve the pub-
lic interest.92
In a 2007 case, however, the Court of Special Appeals found that a
licensing regime for hospice caregivers which exempted care services from a
certificate-of-need requirement if they had worked in the jurisdiction for a
specified twelve-month period was easily distinguishable from Mercer and
Johnson.93  Those cases, according to the court, “involve discriminatory classi-
fications based entirely on a company’s residency,” yet this law did “not
afford hospice providers from one county an advantage over out-of-county
hospices; rather, it grant[ed] the hospice providers that were providing ser-
vices in [the county] the privilege of maintaining their licenses in those coun-
ties, regardless of residency.”94  Because the court distinguished the Mercer
and Johnson cases while analyzing the Section 41 claim, it is plausible that
Maryland courts consider these decisions to be relevant in interpreting the
provision.95  Furthermore, the court distinguished this case from Raney
because the place-of-business classification was reasonable and served the
public interest of “ensuring that new health care services and facilities are
developed only as needed, as measured by their cost effectiveness, quality,
and geographical location.”96
Overall, Maryland has relatively limited precedent for applying Section
41 to protect entrepreneurs and consumers from government-created
monopolies.  The use of Lord Coke’s definition and the Raney line of cases
dealing with licensing distinctions based on place of business do provide
some insight.  These cases clearly stand for the proposition that classifications
between license applicants or potential businesspeople cannot be unreasona-
ble in order to satisfy a public interest.  Furthermore, in dicta, the court
noted that in other states, when membership in a trade organization is
required to do business (like the state bar association), “denial of member-
ship has generally been held reviewable, and if the refusal is found to be
90 See State v. Mercer, 103 A. 570, 572 (Md. 1918); Mayor & City of Havre de Grace v.
Johnson, 123 A. 65, 67 (Md. 1923).
91 Mercer, 103 A. at 571.
92 Johnson, 123 A. at 65, 67.
93 Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene v. VNA Hospice, 933 A.2d 512, 526 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2007), vacated, 961 A.2d 557 (Md. 2008).  This case was vacated by the Court of
Appeals on procedural grounds and the merits of the constitutional claims were not
reviewed.
94 Id.
95 But see FRIEDMAN, supra note 70, at 46 (stating that Raney is the only case to invali-
date a law under Section 41).
96 VNA Hospice, 933 A.2d at 526.  This reasoning is in contrast to a similar certificate of
need case in North Carolina.  See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
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unjustified (e.g., in violation of state law or the association’s by-laws), mem-
bership will be compelled.”97  This indicates that in future occupational
licensing challenges, Maryland courts will be open to hearing claims about
the unreasonableness of the licensure requirement or the treatment of a par-
ticular applicant.  Furthermore, Maryland courts frequently cite rulings from
other state courts, indicating that persuasive authority, perhaps discussed in
the states that follow, could be useful in making a claim.
B. North Carolina (1776)
Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state and shall not be
allowed.98
North Carolina was the second colonial government to include an
antimonopoly provision in its state constitution, and the provision has
remained almost entirely unchanged in subsequent constitutions since
1776.99  North Carolina’s unique history as a proprietary colony gifted to
eight men by King Charles II informed the state’s rejection of unequal privi-
leges.100  Not only was the colony’s antimonopoly sentiment inspired by
English rule, but one of the state constitution’s remedies was inherited from
Great Britain as the English Statute of Monopolies was likely a model for
Section 34.101  Like in North Carolina, the problems of perpetuities and
monopolies—both perceived to create an unjust accumulation of wealth—
were targeted in the Statute of Monopolies.102  As explained by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in an early decision interpreting the provision,
“[t]he meaning and purpose was to forbid and abolish all hereditary and
perpetual monopolies as ‘contrary to the genius of a free State,’”103 but the
court later clarified that “[a] monopoly need not be a perpetuity, nor is a
perpetuity necessarily a monopoly; but both, existing either jointly or sever-
ally, are within the constitutional prohibition.”104
97 Grempler v. Multiple Listing Bureau of Harford Cnty., Inc. 266 A.2d 1, 6 (Md.
1970).
98 N.C. CONST. art. I, § 34.
99 See Tate, supra note 68.  The current wording of “shall not be allowed” replaced
“ought not to be allowed” in 1971 as an editorial change.  John V. Orth, Allowing Perpetuities
in North Carolina, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 399, 401 n.10 (2009).
100 See Tate, supra note 68, at 1824.
101 Steven J. Horowitz & Robert H. Sitkoff, Unconstitutional Perpetual Trusts, 67 VAND. L.
REV. 1769, 1801 n.169 (2014).
102 Id.
103 McRee v. Wilmington & Raleigh R.R., 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 186, 190 (1855); see also
Carolina Water Serv., Inc. v. Town of Pine Knoll Shores, 551 S.E.2d 558, 561 (N.C. Ct. App.
2001) (“The provisions . . . that purport to give Carolina Water exclusive easements and
exclusive rights to supply water to Pine Knoll Shores for an unlimited period of time can-
not be enforced because they are in violation of our state’s public policy against monopo-
lies and perpetuities.”).
104 Thrift v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 30 S.E. 349, 351 (N.C. 1898).
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The North Carolina Supreme Court has struggled with applying the
English origins of the law.  In an 1898 decision, the court lamented that the
definition of monopolies intended by the drafters—that a monopoly was “an
exclusive right granted to a few of something which was before of common
right”—led to “error” in judicial decisions.105  Lord Coke framed his defini-
tion “while the judges were still under the spell of the feudal system.”106  Yet
under representative government, “all rights and privileges are primarily of
common right, unless their restraint becomes necessary for the public
good.”107  The Thrift court went on to invalidate a thirty-year exclusive grant
to a private waterworks provider largely because the municipal monopoly
would have been “unjust and harmful in [its] results” as the contract “would
place beyond its power for nearly a generation all opportunity of securing for
its citizens the benefits and improvements of a progressive age.”108  Essen-
tially, the contract was contrary to the public good.
Thus, despite the absolutist language of Section 34, the prohibition on
monopolies has always been cabined by the state’s valid exercise of the police
power in pursuit of the common good.  After Thrift, the state supreme court
oftentimes merged the definition of monopoly with a valid exercise of the
state’s police power so that when an anticompetitive law had no reasonable
relationship to a necessary public good, it then created a monopoly.109  The
Fourth Circuit summarized that “[t]he Supreme Court of North Carolina has
interpreted this clause to allow ‘reasonable regulations’ of commerce with a
substantial relationship to public health, safety, or welfare.”110  This rule has
been applied to two types of state-granted monopolies: (1) regulations which
act to restrain trade; and (2) occupational licensing.  Both are addressed in
turn.
1. Regulations Which Act to Restrain Trade
North Carolina courts have always accepted that some laws which
restrain trade are acceptable as long as the act is in the public interest.  In a
1909 case, for example, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the grant
of a privilege to operate a market house because the facility was regulated
and essentially controlled by the city.111  The city had determined that the
market house was necessary and thus the legislation was “entitled to liberal
construction, and the scope, if within constitutional limits, is very largely
within the discretion of the authorities, and not subject to judicial interfer-
ence.”112  Similarly, the court upheld a law which prevented entrepreneurs





109 See, e.g., State v. Harris, 6 S.E.2d 854, 866 (N.C. 1940).
110 Cap. Associated Indus., Inc. v. Stein, 922 F.3d 198, 211 (4th Cir. 2019).
111 State v. Perry, 65 S.E. 915, 917 (N.C. 1909).
112 Id.
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from selling food and drinks at a fair unless he or she did regular business
within the territory.113  While the law certainly sounds like a classic case of
incumbent industries using the law to keep out competitors, the court
upheld the law largely because “large numbers of people congregate at their
fairs, and from the very nature of such assemblies, regulations for the preser-
vation of order are necessary.”114  In addition to the public interest the court
found in both cases, the reasoning also depended on the fact that neither law
actually created a monopoly.115  Neither case, however, explicitly defined
what would constitute a monopoly.
In 1939, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the validity of a fair
trade law which restricted the resale price of trademarked products bought
in wholesale.116  Citing past precedent and Black’s Law Dictionary, the court
provided a definition of monopoly which was based on the company’s ability
to fulfill the ill effects of monopoly: restrict competition and control
prices.117  Despite the fact that the court’s definition seemed far removed
from Lord Coke’s original term, the holding still depended on the fact that
no party was denied a common right by the law.  In part of its reasoning, the
court insisted that the law “does [not] deny to any member of the public a
free and equal opportunity to do anything which he might theretofore have
done as a matter of common right.  The freedom to do as one may wish with
the good will, brand, or trade-mark of another has never been conceded by
the law.”118
In American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina officially broke from Lord Coke’s definition for this line of cases.119
Instead, the court upheld a provision of the Motor Vehicle Dealers and Man-
ufacturers Licensing Law which regulates the establishment of new franchises
113 State v. Stovall, 8 S.E. 900, 900 (N.C. 1889).
114 Id. at 901.
115 See also Tobacco Growers’ Co-op. Ass’n v. Jones, 117 S.E. 174, 177–78 (N.C. 1923)
(“[S]tipulations in partial restraint of trade were held not to be obnoxious to the law,
unless they were unreasonable and likely to become monopolies which are obnoxious to
our constitutional provisions.”).
116 Ely Lilly & Co. v. Saunders, 4 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1939), overruled by Bulova Watch Co.
v. Brand Distrib. of N. Wilkesboro, Inc., 206 S.E.2d 141 (N.C. 1974).  The court in Bulova
Watch found that the fair trade law was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative author-
ity to a private corporation and a deprivation of “liberty and property otherwise than by the
law of the land” in violation of the state constitution. Bulova Watch, 206 S.E.2d at 146.  The
court did not revisit the validity of the law under the Section 34.
117 Ely Lilly & Co., 4 S.E.2d at 534–35.
118 Id. at 535.  See supra note 76, infra note 164, and accompanying text for a discussion
of how other states have upheld fair trade laws.
119 317 S.E.2d 351 (N.C. 1984).  The court also broke from past precedent.  In Town of
Clinton v. Standard Oil Co., 137 S.E. 183 (N.C. 1927), the court had invalidated a restriction
which prevented any new gasoline filling stations in a geographic district.  There, the court
was persuaded by Standard Oil’s argument that monopoly originated from the Greek term
“sole seller” and “that the six present sellers would be the sole sellers for all time in
perpetuity, excluding the Standard Oil Company, and this was a monopoly.” Id. at 184.
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that distribute the same line-make of automobiles in a geographic area.120
The state Commissioner of Motor Vehicles enjoined the Jeep franchise of
Hubert Vickers after James Pennell, who had already had a franchise in the
area, requested a hearing.121  Like in Ely Lilly, monopoly required control of
such a large portion of the market that “competition is stifled,” “freedom of
commerce is restricted,” and “the monopolist controls prices.”122  For the
court, being the only seller of Jeeps in the defined geographic area did not
meet this definition.  Rather, “[i]n order to monopolize, one must control a
consumer’s access to new goods by being the only reasonably available source
of those goods. . . .  Logically, then, the market encompasses geographically
at least all areas within reasonable proximity of potential customers.”123
According to the court, the harm that Section 34 was meant to prevent
was surely not the danger of the state picking economic winners and losers,
and the “attendant humiliation and insecurity”124 inherent in such a system,
but the evil of horizontal restraints on trade—restrictions between dealers
rather than a vertical restraint on trade, which would run from the manufac-
turer down to the franchisee.125  Essentially, in this vertical monopoly,
franchises can still compete across geographic lines and are under pressure
from automobile manufacturers to keep prices competitive.  Restraint of
trade was not enough to invalidate the law when residents in the geographic
area could always flee the monopoly by crossing the “arbitrary lines”126 set by
the state to seek better business practices from the next vertical monopoly
over.
The court’s conclusion that no monopoly was created was heavily influ-
enced by the fact that for many consumers, there were other Jeep dealerships
across geographic lines that were actually closer.127  Thus, in a recent supe-
rior court decision, the court denied a defendant’s request for Judgment as a
Matter of Law on the plaintiff’s Section 34 claim because the plaintiff suffi-
ciently alleged a lack of reasonable substitutes.128  Demonstrating that com-
petitive pressure actually is lacking in a market is clearly more work for a
plaintiff than simply demonstrating the existence of a restraint on trade, but
it still gives plaintiffs a way to win claims against vertical monopolies.
While American Motors exempted many regulations that restrain trade
from the Section 34 prohibition, there are still some business regulations that
cannot withstand scrutiny.  Notably, a 1979 case invalidating an equalization
payment is still good law.  The law at issue in Arcadia Dairy required produc-
120 Charles Noel Anderson, Jr., American Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters: Green Light to
Territorial Security for Automobile Dealers, 63 N.C. L. REV. 1080, 1080 (1985).
121 Id. at 1080–81.
122 Am. Motors Sales Corp., 317 S.E.2d at 356.
123 Id.
124 State v. Harris, 6 S.E.2d 854, 864 (N.C. 1940).
125 Am. Motors Sales Corp., 317 S.E.2d at 357.
126 Id. at 356.
127 Id.
128 DiCesare v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., No. 16 CVS 16404, 2019 WL
984301, at *9 (N.C. Sup. Ct. Feb. 27, 2019).
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ers of reconstituted milk (milk made from a mixture of lacteal secretion, milk
solids, and water) to make an equalization payment to regular milk produc-
ers.129  The payment was meant to combat displacement of whole or low-fat
milk producers by the reconstituted milk, which was sold at a lower price.  In
a short opinion, the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s
finding that the law was invalid for, among other things, violating Section 34
because the law was intended to prohibit competition between reconstituted
and whole milk producers.130  Essentially, the law enforced a horizontal
monopoly of milk producers by making it harder for a milk substitute to
compete in the market.
In Arcadia Dairy, the court made clear the power of the state cannot,
consistent with Section 34, be used to favor one industry or business over
another because the backing of the state creates a monopoly.131 American
Motors relaxes this protection while allowing the state to favor one Jeep
franchise over another, simply by virtue of being there first.
2. Occupational Licensing
Challenges to occupational licensing have been traditionally successful
under Section 34.132  While occupational licensing does not meet the mod-
ern conception of a monopoly, it clearly falls within Lord Coke’s definition of
a monopoly as a denial of a common right.  Further, the state supreme court
has held that the American Motors definition of monopoly does not apply to
licensing questions because the cases do not concern regulation of a private
market, but a category of licensure created by the state.133  Moreover, occu-
pational licensing regimes would create a horizontal monopoly, which is
another distinguishing factor from American Motors.134
In an 1897 decision, the state supreme court laid out the general rule for
occupational licensing regimes under Section 34: the licensing regime must
be
129 In re Arcadia Dairy Farms, Inc., 259 S.E.2d 368, 369 (N.C. 1979).
130 Id. at 370–72.
131 See also In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hosp., Inc., 193 S.E.2d 729, 736
(N.C. 1973)  The court held that a certificate of need requirement to build a new hospital
was unconstitutional because “[t]he Constitution of this State does not, however, permit
the Legislature to confer upon the Medical Care Commission the power of a guardian to
protect Aston Park from possible bad financial judgment.  Nor does it permit the Legisla-
ture to grant to the Medical Care Commission authority to exclude Aston Park from this
field of service in order to protect existing hospitals from competition otherwise legiti-
mate.” Id.
132 See Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 1087 (“Historically, North Carolina has
been the state where challenges to occupational licensing schemes have had the most
success. . . .”).
133 See Rockford-Cohen Grp., LLC v. N.C. Dep’t of Ins., 749 S.E.2d 469, 473 (N.C.
2013).
134 American Motors distinguished itself from licensing because these cases involved hori-
zontal restraints on trade.  Am. Motors Sales Corp. v. Peters, 317 S.E.2d 351, 358 (N.C.
1984).
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an exercise of the police power for the protection of the public against
incompetents and impostors, and is in no sense the creation of a monopoly
or special privileges.  The door [must] stand[ ] open to all who possess the
requisite age and good character, and can stand the examination which is
exacted of all applicants alike.135
Thus, there are two general rules for a licensing system to be constitutional:
(1) the application must be open to all; and (2) there must be a reasonable
public interest justification in licensing the industry.
In Rockford v. Cohen Group, the court relied on Lord Coke’s definition of
monopoly in 2013 to reaffirm the first rule.136  The state law in question was
a licensing system for bail bondsman training.137  Previously, anyone could
apply to the state commissioner of insurance to provide such training, but
the law was changed so that only one agency could provide the licensure
training.138  By amending the law, the court determined that the commission
had taken away the common right to apply creditable bail bondsman
training.139
Similarly, in State v. Sasseen, the North Carolina Supreme Court evalu-
ated a change to a law which took away the ability for taxi drivers to self-
indemnify through personal surety.140  Taking away the option would have “a
tendency to create a monopoly and turn the business over to a privileged
class without allowing personal surety or sureties, which was, until recent
years, the kind of bond usually required and given.”141
Additionally, the court has always required a reasonable justification for
occupational licensing.  As a result, there are “professions and skilled trades
which in the public interest permit of regulation by licensing under the
police power, and those ordinary lawful and innocuous occupations and
trades which are protected from regulation by constitutional guarantees.
The occupations and trades in the latter category constitute off-limits
135 State v. Call, 28 S.E. 517, 517 (N.C. 1897).
136 Rockford-Cohen Grp., LLC, 749 S.E.2d at 473.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id. The court distinguished this case from Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Mor-
ganton, 386 S.E.2d 200 (N.C. 1989), a case in which the city set up a municipal cable system
and declined to grant franchises to any other competitors.  The city did not create a
monopoly because “it has not foreclosed for any period the possibility that franchises
might be granted to other applicants.” Id. 211.  The holding in Madison Cablevision creates
a potentially concerning loophole: all the state would have had to do is indefinitely claim
that they may grant licenses or franchises to other applicants.  This appears to be what the
City of Morganton did—there is no evidence that the city ever opened up applications to
other franchises. See History of CoMPAS, MORGANTON NORTH CAROLINA, https://mor-
gantonnc.gov/index.php/government/compas/history-of-compas (last visited Oct. 10,
2020).
140 175 S.E. 142 (N.C. 1934).
141 Id. at 144; see also Whaley v. Lenoir Cnty., 168 S.E.2d 411, 415–16 (N.C. 1969) (find-
ing that grandfather clause which limited who could obtain an ambulance franchise based
on prior operations was unconstitutional).
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ground.”142  These businesses in the off-limits category are “in essence, a pri-
vate business unaffected in a legal sense with any public interest.”143  Exam-
ples of licensing regimes which the North Carolina Supreme Court has
determined are off limits are tile-laying,144 photography,145 and dry clean-
ing.146  Additionally, even if a state may regulate an industry, it must do so
reasonably and nondiscriminatorily.  For example, in State v. Warren, the
court invalidated a real estate licensing regime which applied only to certain
counties in the state because it required real estate agents to obtain a state
license and additional local licenses.147
In assessing the state’s justification, the court should watch for pretex-
tual public interest justifications.148  Yet the state courts have been deferen-
tial of regulation and licensure of professional occupations that require
special skill or training “to protect the health, comfort, safety, and welfare of
the people general acts have been passed and held constitutional, relating to
professions and trades that require skill, learning, and training, such as attor-
neys at law, physicians, dentists, surgeons, accountants, osteopaths, chiroprac-
tors, opticians, cosmetologists, barbers, plumbers, etc.”149  Thus, the courts
have stated that reasonable regulation of occupations including lawyers,150
real estate agents,151 optometrists,152 doctors,153 barbers,154 plumbers,155
and pilots156 are permissible under Section 34.
The main distinction between the two categories is not truly the exis-
tence of skill, as the court has occasionally claimed.  In State v. Ballance,
where the court invalidated a licensing regime of photographers, the court
admitted that photography requires skill and training just like other regu-
lated professionals.  The real distinction was that photography was not tied
up in the public interest.  While a photographer must possess skill,
so [too] must the actor, the baker, the bookbinder, the bookkeeper, the
carpenter, the cook, the editor, the farmer, the goldsmith, the horseshoer,
142 Roller v. Allen, 96 S.E.2d 851, 859 (N.C. 1957).
143 State v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731, 735 (N.C. 1949).
144 See Roller, 96 S.E.2d at 851.
145 See Ballance, 51 S.E.2d at 732.
146 See State v. Harris, 6 S.E.2d 854, 856 (N.C. 1940).
147 See 189 S.E. 108, 110 (N.C. 1937).
148 See Harris, 6 S.E.2d at 864.
149 See Warren, 189 S.E. at 110.
150 See Cap. Associated Indus., Inc. v. Stein, 922 F.3d 198, 202 (4th Cir. 2019).
151 See Warren, 189 S.E. at 111 (“The state can no doubt, in a state-wide act, make rea-
sonable regulations in regard to the real estate business.”).
152 See Palmer v. Smith, 51 S.E.2d 8, 9 (N.C. 1948).
153 See State v. Call, 28 S.E. 517, 517 (N.C. 1897).
154 See State v. Lockey, 152 S.E. 693, 693 (N.C. 1930); see also Motley v. State Bd. of
Barber Exam’rs, 45 S.E.2d 550, 552 (N.C. 1947) (relying on Lockey to hold that the state
barbers board’s decision to admit veterans into the trade without undergoing the required
training was not unconstitutional).
155 See Roach v. City of Durham, 169 S.E. 149, 150 (N.C. 1933).
156 See St. George v. Hardie, 60 S.E. 920, 921 (N.C. 1908).
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the horticulturist, the jeweler, the machinist, the mechanic, the musician,
the painter, the paper-hanger, the plasterer, the printer, the reporter, the
silversmith, the stonecutter, the storekeeper, the tailor, the watchmaker, the
wheelwright, the woodcarver, and every other person successfully engaged in
a definitely specialized occupation, be it called a trade, a business, an art, or
a profession.  Yet, who would maintain that the legislature would promote
the general welfare by requiring a mental and moral examination prelimi-
nary to permitting individuals to engage in these vocations merely because
they involve knowledge and skill?157
This list provides a starting point for professionals that likely could not be
regulated under Section 34.
In future litigation, the best arguments against licensure under Section
34 are unequal application of the licensing regime so that it is a denial of a
common right or regulation of an industry without any benefit to the com-
mon good.
C. Tennessee (1796)
That perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state, and shall
not be allowed.158
The Tennessee Constitution of 1796 included an antimonopoly provi-
sion.159  The provision had nearly identical language to the North Carolina
provision, and this was likely no coincidence: “[T]he Tennessee Constitution
of 1796 drew heavily upon the North Carolina example because the territory
of Tennessee was previously part of North Carolina and thus subject to the
North Carolina Constitution.”160  Like North Carolina, Tennessee courts
have used Lord Coke’s definition of monopoly in interpreting Section 22.
Thus, in an early case concerning an exclusive grant to provide waterworks,
the court determined that “[t]he question then is narrowed down to the
inquiry, did the individuals composing the Memphis Water Company have
the right, before their incorporation, in common with all others, to erect
water works in Memphis. . . ?”161  Holding that the right to provide water-
works is not a common right, the grant was not a monopoly.162  Lord Coke’s
definition has been applied to many other cases to uphold government
grants.163  Also like other states, the court relied on Lord Coke’s definition to
157 State v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731, 735–36 (N.C. 1949).
158 TENN. CONST. art. I, § 22; see also id. art. I, § 29 (“That an equal participation in the
free navigation of the Mississippi, is one of the inherent rights of the citizens of this state; it
cannot, therefore, be conceded to any prince, potentate, power, person or persons
whatever.”).
159 TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 23.
160 Tate, supra note 68, at 1824 n.2.
161 City of Memphis v. Memphis Water Co., 52 Tenn. (5 Heisk.) 495, 529–30 (1871).
162 Id. at 530.
163 See, e.g., Leeper v. State, 53 S.W. 962, 964 (Tenn. 1899) (considering textbooks sold
to public schools and finding that a monopoly was not created from the competitive bid-
ding process).
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uphold a fair trade act which set minimum prices for the resale of trade-
marked goods because the trademark holder already had a monopoly over
the sale of their product.164
Additionally, the Tennessee court also adopted a conception of the
police power which allowed the state to create monopolies which did not
violate Section 22.  Interestingly, in Noe v. Town of Morristown, the court held
that while a municipality could not create a monopoly in one company to do
all of the slaughtering of animals, the city could designate a single slaughter-
house where every person would have a right to slaughter animals there.165
The court relied on the Slaughterhouse Cases, where the Supreme Court
upheld a similar statute in New Orleans.166  Once the antimonopoly provi-
sion has been weakened by an expansive view of the public good and state
police power, it provided no more protection in this case than the Four-
teenth Amendment.  That contract was still invalid because the slaughter-
house had an exclusive right to slaughter the animals in addition to hosting
the exclusive space.167
Yet in Checker Cab Co. v. City of Johnson City, the Tennessee Supreme
Court found unconstitutional a licensing regime in which no new taxicabs
were licensed until a certificate of public convenience and necessity was
granted after a public hearing, a finding of additional need, and giving the
existing operators in the city sixty days to provide the needed additional ser-
vice.168  The court determined that “[t]he monopoly of the taxi business in
Johnson City granted to the appellants by the hereinabove quoted portion of
Section 6 of this Private Act is just about as exclusive and complete as may be
conceived.”169  In order to be valid, the court held that the state-created
monopoly must have a legitimate relation to the public purpose of the law.170
In this case, the monopoly did not fulfill the public purpose of regulating the
taxicab industry.171
In other cases—especially later ones—the court has been much more
deferential to the legislative purpose.  In Nashville Mobilphone Co. v. Atkins, a
similar statute for telephone companies requiring a certificate of public con-
venience and necessity be granted to a new provider only after the existing
company is given notice and a chance to provide adequate service was
upheld.172  Similarly, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld a limitation on
the number of liquor stores even though “[a]s a practical matter, such limita-
164 Frankfort Distillers Corp. v. Liberto, 230 S.W.2d 971, 974 (Tenn. 1950).  For a com-
parison of how other states have treated fair trade laws, see supra notes 76, 116 and accom-
panying text.
165 161 S.W. 485, 487 (Tenn. 1913).
166 Id. at 486 (citing the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873)).
167 Id. at 487.
168 216 S.W.2d 335, 337–38 (Tenn. 1948).
169 Id. at 336.
170 Id. at 337.
171 Id. 337–38.
172 536 S.W.2d 335, 340 (Tenn. 1976); see also Dial-A-Page, Inc. v. Bissell, 823 S.W.2d
202, 209 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
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tion has a tendency to accomplish that which is monopolistic” because “an
incidental monopoly” does not “offend[ ] the anti-monopoly clause of our
Constitution, if the actual and real tendency of such ordinance or statute is to
effect the purpose of protecting the safety, health and morals of the
public.”173
Perhaps the most deferential holding is found in two cases dealing with
geographic monopolies for vehicle franchises.  In a 1960 case, the state
supreme court upheld a licensing regime for franchises which included con-
sumer protection measures and administrative procedures for removal of
licensure.174  Because the act covered all aspects of the industry—dealers,
distributors, and salesmen—the court determined it did not violate Section
22.175  In 1983, the franchise act was challenged again after it was amended
to “prohibit[ ] direct competition by a manufacturer with a franchised
dealer, discrimination among franchisees and the granting of additional
competitive franchises in a market area previously franchised to existing deal-
ers.”176  Unlike the lengthy North Carolina opinion finding similar geo-
graphic restrictions constitutional,177 the court quickly concluded that “[w]e
find no merit whatever in the suggestion of General Motors that the statutes
in question purport to create a monopoly and do not consider that the mat-
ter warrants extended discussion.”178
For future litigation it is not clear how successful licensing challenges
will be under Tennessee law.  More recent cases have been very deferential to
the legislature’s stated public purpose.  The best litigation tactic is likely to
challenge that purpose as pretextual, but no case besides the extreme exam-
ple of Checker Cab has had success with this litigation strategy.
D. Texas (1836)
Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free government, and shall
never be allowed, nor shall the law of primogeniture or entailments ever be in force in
this State.179
The Texas antimonopoly provision is unique in its origin as it was origi-
nally included in the 1836 Constitution of the Republic of Texas.180  Section
26 has remained in every state constitution since.  The Section also contains a
173 Landman v. Kizer, 255 S.W.2d 6, 7 (Tenn. 1953); see also Ketner v. Clabo, 225
S.W.2d 54, 56 (Tenn. 1949).
174 See Ford Motor Co. v. Pace, 335 S.W.2d 360 (Tenn. 1960).
175 Id. at 365.
176 Gen. Motors Corp. v. Capitol Chevrolet Co., 645 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tenn. 1983).
177 See supra notes 119–26 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 256–59 and
accompanying text.
178 General Motors Corp., 645 S.W.2d at 238.
179 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 26.
180 J.D. Forrest, Anti-Monopoly Legislation in the United States, 1 AM. J. SOC. 411, 413
(1896).
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prohibition on primogeniture and entailment,181 both of which had been
prohibited in Spanish and Mexican law but were allowed under the English
common law.182  Despite these unique characteristics of the provision, there
is evidence that the framers of the 1836 constitution would have been famil-
iar with the North Carolina antimonopoly provision, which may explain the
nearly identical first clause.183
Inclusion of the antimonopoly provision reflects the economic situation
in the Republic of Texas.  Most Texans were debtors and faced high prices
for goods that were sold without much competition.184  Building on this sen-
timent, the 1836 Texas Constitutional Convention had a majority of Jackso-
nian Democrat delegates—whose draft bill of rights became the basis of the
1845 constitution—and the 1875 convention was dominated by Granger del-
egates who “wanted a constitution that would curtail government power and
prevent economic domination by large monopolies and expansive business
interests.”185  Additionally, Texas has a long history of antitrust law which has
dominated litigation over monopolies.186  Thus, there is not a very robust
caselaw analyzing Section 26 as a restraint on government action.  Most cases
discuss exclusive grants of government duties, and only a few cases assess the
constitutionality of regulations that may tend to create monopolies.  Both are
addressed in turn.
1. Exclusive Grants
While the Texas Bill of Rights certainly incorporated elements of the
English common law,187 there is no evidence that Texas courts ever fully
adopted Lord Coke’s definition of monopoly in Section 26 analysis.  In one
of the first cases interpreting the provision, the court relied on the Greek
meaning of the word “monos, alone, and polio, to deal, and is defined to be
the sole power of making, dealing in, or being otherwise interested in any-
thing.”188  Further, the court cited Bouvier’s law dictionary to find that “a
grant from the sovereign power of a state by commission, letters patent or
otherwise, to any person or corporation, by which the exclusive right of buy-
ing, selling, making, working or using anything is given, constitutes a monop-
181 These were devices which could limit the rules of inheritance. GEORGE D. BRADEN
ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANAL-
YSIS 79–80 (1977), https://www.sll.texas.gov/assets/pdf/braden/the-constitution-of-the-
state-of-texas-an-annotated-and-comparative-analysis.pdf.
182 J. E. Ericson, Origins of the Texas Bill of Rights, 62 SW. HIST. Q. 457, 460 (1959).
183 Tate, supra note 68, at 1824 n.2.
184 John Cornyn, The Roots of the Texas Constitution: Settlement to Statehood, 26 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 1089, 1129 n.239 (1995).
185 James C. Harrington, Framing a Texas Bill of Rights Argument, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J. 399,
402–04 (1993) (describing the development of the Texas Bill of Rights).
186 See Paul Womack, Monopolies, TEX. ST. HIST. ASS’N, https://tshaonline.org/hand-
book/online/articles/jtmqu (last visited Oct. 10, 2020).
187 Ericson, supra note 182, at 466.
188 City of Brenham v. Becker, 1 White & W. 714, 714–15 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1881).
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oly.”189  In that case, the court held that a city could not, in exchange for
building a town hall, grant a monopoly on the sale of fresh meats and fish to
a market owned by a man named Smith for ten years.190  The court found
that the contract was invalid because it allowed a monopoly and was an
attempt by the legislature to abdicate its legislative power.191
Because Texas courts did not define monopolies to be an exclusive grant
of a common right, the court has been more aggressive in policing municipal
contracts.  In City of Brenham v. Brenham Water Co., the court invalidated a
twenty-five-year contract for the exclusive right to sell water to its citizens.192
Despite the court admitting that, “[i]t has been said . . . that there can be no
monopoly in the use of a street to lay down gas or water mains or pipes,
because it is not a matter of common right to use streets for such purpose,”
the exclusive grant, even though it was limited in duration, was forbidden.193
Thus, the general rule in Texas has been that exclusive franchises by munici-
palities for water, gas, and electric utilities are forbidden.194  In order to be
invalidated as an unconstitutional monopoly, however, the grant by the city
must be unequivocally exclusive so that the city can be considered to have
bartered away its police power.195
This strict limitation on exclusive grants to utility companies does not
prevent a city from governing effectively.  A municipality may enter into con-
tracts for water or electricity that do not bind the city to an exclusive arrange-
ment.196  Furthermore, the rule against exclusive grants does not extend to
all local government functions.  The city may create exclusive offices to
enforce rules or collect taxes because “[r]equiring an officer to perform
some governmental function to the exclusion of all others is not the creation
of a monopoly or perpetuity within the meaning of the Constitution.”197
Most notably, in Brenham Water Co., the court left open the possibility that
there may be “certain classes of exclusive privileges which do not amount to
monopolies.”198  Since then, the Texas Supreme Court has held that exclu-
189 Id. at 715.
190 Id. at 716.
191 Id.
192 4 S.W. 143, 156 (Tex. 1887).
193 Id. at 153.  See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text for a comparison to public
utility cases in Maryland.
194 See, e.g., Jones v. Carter, 101 S.W. 514, 517 (Tex. App. 1907) (finding exclusive right
to streets and alleyways for street-railways, electricity poles and wires, and telegraph wires
invalid).
195 See, e.g., City of Garland v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 295 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Tex. App.
1956) (“An exclusive grant will not be declared or found unless given by express terms or
by clear implication.” (citations omitted)).
196 See, e.g., id.
197 Ex parte London, 163 S.W. 968, 970 (Tex. Crim. App. 1913); see also Ex parte Savage,
141 S.W. 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1911) (holding that a city could give an official exclu-
sive authority to regulate billboards).
198 City of Brenham v. Brenham Water Co., 4 S.W. 143, 153 (Tex. 1887).
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sive contracts for waste removal belong in this category because garbage is
not “useful and innocent article[ ] to consumers.”199
Moreover, Texas courts have held that some exclusive contracts may not
be broad enough to constitute a monopoly.  In Apani Southwest, Inc. v. Coca-
Cola Enterprises, Inc., the Fifth Circuit found that the exclusive right to sell
Coca-Cola products at twenty-seven city facilities “does not involve the degree
of exclusivity required to constitute a ‘monopoly’ under the Texas Constitu-
tion.”200  The court distinguished from the municipal contracts cases
because in those cases “[t]he citizens of those cities were forced to purchase
electrical, water or other utilities for their private consumption in their
homes from a party the city chose to grant an exclusive franchise”—essen-
tially, the contract created a city-wide monopoly.201  Texas courts have also
found that a contract to buy and use textbooks in public schools for five
years202 and a lease of lakes to a country club did not create monopolies.203
It is not clear where Texas courts will determine that an exclusive contract
has gone “too far” and becomes an unconstitutional monopoly.  The best
arguments that a contract is monopolistic likely will be based on the reason-
ing used in the Brenham Water Co. line of cases: that the contract will result in
increased prices, leaves citizens without any meaningful alternative, and is
abrogation of the legislative duty to regulate for the public good.204
In more recent cases, the court has “recognized four exceptions to the
rule that exclusive contracts are prohibited monopolies.”205  These were
taken from antitrust cases but have since been given as a rule for Section 26
cases:
(1) contract of agency wherein the agent is prohibited from dealing for him-
self or representing others besides his principal, (2) contract for the sale of a
business in which the seller agrees for a limited time not to engage in a
competing business within a limited territory, (3) lease contract where the
lessee agrees on the leased premises to sell only certain products, and (4)
cases in which an exclusive right or privilege is granted only upon the prop-
erty or premises of the grantor.206
199 See, e.g., City of San Antonio v. San Antonio Irrigation Co., 12 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex.
Comm’n App. 1929).
200 300 F.3d 620, 636 (5th Cir. 2002).
201 Id.
202 See Charles Scribner’s Sons v. Marrs, 262 S.W. 722, 723, 729–30 (Tex. 1924).
203 See Henrietta Country Club v. Jacobs, 269 S.W. 137, 137, 139 (Tex. App. 1924).
204 Brenham Water Co., 4 S.W. at 153 (“Such an exclusive right prevents competition,
and tends to high prices; all matters affecting which the contract before us surrenders the
right further to regulate for a quarter of a century.”).
205 Airport Coach Serv., Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 518 S.W.2d 566, 572 (Tex. App.
1974).
206 Id.
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In Airport Coach Services, because the city exclusively owned the airport, it
could make an exclusive contract for ground transportation services.207
Exception four has been similarly applied to an exclusive right to broadcast
from a high school football field.208
2. Regulation of Industry
Outside of the context of exclusive grants, regulations which restrain
trade or limit the number of competitors are almost always upheld under
Section 26.  This is because the requirements to form a monopoly through
regulation are more absolute in Texas than in other states.  In fact, Texas has
never invalidated a statute under Section 26 for creating a monopoly through
regulatory measure.  In Lens Express, Inc. v. Ewald, the appellate court
adopted a rule for monopolies used in antitrust cases—the plaintiff must
prove: “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2)
the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acu-
men, or historical accident.”209  In rejecting Lens Express’s claim that
“optometrists and ophthalmologists have a monopoly on the sale of contact
lenses in Texas because a complete prescription is required in order for any
other entity to sell the lenses to consumers,” the court reasoned that “[t]he
existence of so many competing optometrists suggests that, absent a price-
fixing conspiracy, competition will prevent them from charging outrageous
sums for contact lenses.”210  Thus, if any monopoly arose in the market, it
would be a collusion under antitrust law, rather than a result of occupational
licensing.
While this rule was not announced until 1995 for Section 26 claims,
Texas courts essentially followed the Lens Express test in earlier cases—no reg-
ulation was found to create a monopoly under the first prong.  For example,
in an 1899 case, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that a law giving rail-
roads the exclusive right to sell railroad tickets did not create monopoly211
and in City of Wichita Falls v. Roberson, the court rejected claims that compre-
hensive butcher regulations which put smaller butchers out of business cre-
ated a monopoly.212  Additionally, the appellate court held that a monopoly
was not created when a bond was required to operate a jitney or motorbus
but not a taxi213 nor when an ordinance prohibited jitneys from the city
207 Id.; see also Indep. Taxicab Drivers’ Emps. v. Greater Hous. Transp. Co., 760 F.2d
607, 613 (5th Cir. 1985) (taxi pickup at airport); Continental Bus Sys., Inc. v. City of Dallas,
386 F. Supp. 359, 368 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (bus pickup at airport).
208 Sw. Broad. Co. v. Oil Ctr. Broad. Co., 210 S.W.2d 230, 233–34 (Tex. App. 1947).
209 907 S.W.2d 64, 70 (Tex. App. 1995) (quoting Caller-Times Publ’g Co. v. Triad
Commc’ns, 826 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex. 1992)).
210 Id.
211 Jannin v. State, 51 S.W. 1126, 1128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1899).
212 283 S.W. 870 (Tex. App. 1926).
213 Auto Transit Co. v. City of Fort Worth, 182 S.W. 685, 692–93 (Tex. App. 1915).
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center so that street railways were the sole provider of transportation.214  The
appellate court’s reasoning in Gill provides evidence of how deferential
Texas courts will be towards regulatory measures that restrain trade:
The convenience, peace, health, and safety of the citizens necessarily deter-
mine the number and extent of similar competing utilities which are to be
permitted to operate.  While none may be given exclusive or monopolistic
rights, it does not follow that all are entitled to enter upon the city streets.
The officers of municipalities are charged with the responsibility of conserv-
ing the convenience of the citizens in such matters, as well as providing for
their peace, health, and safety. Whether they have fairly done so is obviously not a
judicial question.215
Similarly, an appellate court ruled that the state bar was not a monopoly
because it “is the entity charged with regulating the practice of law for the
protection of the public” as “[t]he practice of law is potentially harmful to
the public if practiced by unqualified persons.”216  Essentially, when a public
interest is at stake—as it supposedly always is when the legislature acts—
Texas courts will not second guess regulatory measures.
The prong one hurdle is so insurmountable to antimonopoly challenges
that litigants facing burdensome occupational licensing or regulations would
likely be better off bringing a claim under a different constitutional provision
such as the due course of law clause.217
E. Arkansas (1836)
Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a republic, and shall not be
allowed; nor shall any hereditary emoluments privileges or honors ever be granted or
conferred in this State.218
The antimonopoly provision has been included in almost every Arkansas
constitution since 1836.  It was removed in the 1868 constitution for
unknown reasons but was added back in 1874.219  The Supreme Court of
Arkansas explained the purpose and historical background of the clause in
1884:
The monopolies which in England became so odious as to excite general
opposition, and . . . infuse a detestation which has been transmitted to the
free States of America, were in the nature of exclusive privileges of trade,
granted to favorites or purchasers from the crown, for the enrichment of
individuals, at the cost of the public.  They were supported by no considera-
tions of public good.  They enabled a few to oppress the community by
undue charges for goods or services.  The memory, and historical traditions,
of abuses resulting from this practice, has left the impression that they are
214 Gill v. City of Dallas, 209 S.W. 209, 212 (Tex. App. 1919).
215 Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
216 Favaloro v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 994 S.W.2d 815, 823 (Tex. App. 1999).
217 See, e.g., Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Reg., 469 S.W.3d 69, 74 (Tex. 2015).
218 ARK. CONST. art. II, § 19.
219 N. Little Rock Transp. Co. v. City of N. Little Rock, 184 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Ark. 1944).
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dangerous to Liberty, and it is this kind of monopoly, against which the con-
stitutional provision is directed.220
The court went on to define the scope of the antimonopoly provision in this
historical context as prohibiting monopolies which, as those in England,
“restrained the subject from the exercise of occupations, which otherwlse
[sic] would have been proper.”221  The prohibition on monopolies, however,
did not apply to regulations for the public good—the court upheld a munici-
pality capping liquor licenses at eight and rejecting otherwise qualified
applicants.222
Section 19 has been held to be a restraint on the legislature.223  The
ability for Section 19 to meaningfully constrain government power is thus
dependent on the breadth of the police power.  The Arkansas Supreme
Court summarized the rule as follows:
Yet the courts of Arkansas, like those of all American states, have sustained
these monopolistic grants of special privilege on the ground that it is within
the competency of the legislature to determine under the police power what
regulatory rules are needful in controlling a type of business fraught with
perils to public peace, health and safety as is the liquor business.224
Regulations must be reasonable and designed solely for a legitimate public
purpose.225  Thus, courts have upheld liquor price caps226 and an escrow
fund requirement for certain tobacco companies,227 a monopoly in trash col-
lection,228 a monopoly in the removal of deposits from unsewered privies,229
and solid-waste service230 based on the state’s valid exercise of its police
power.
The police power limitation on Section 19 does not act as a blank check
for government-granted monopolies.  In many cases, the court has required a
real public justification in order to sustain a monopoly incidental to regula-
tion.  For example, the court struck down parts of a regulatory scheme for
220 Ex parte Levy, 43 Ark. 42, 51 (1884).
221 Id. at 52.  This is similar to Lord Coke’s definition of monopoly.  The court applied
Lord Coke’s definition in a 1901 case to find that an exclusive turnpike privilege was not a
monopoly within the definition because it was not a common right.  Ratcliffe v. Pulaski
Turnpike Co., 63 S.W. 70, 75 (Ark. 1901).
222 Ex parte Levy, 43 Ark. at 53.
223 See Twin City Pipe Line Co., v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 357 (1931).  The
Arkansas Supreme Court has even held that zoning applications may create a monopoly in
an as-applied challenge. See City of Little Rock v. Sun Bldg. & Dev. Co., 134 S.W.2d 582,
584 (Ark. 1939).
224 Gipson v. Morley, 233 S.W.2d 79, 83 (Ark. 1950).
225 Dreyfus v. Boone, 114 S.W. 718, 720–21 (Ark. 1908).
226 See Gipson, 233 S.W.2d at 83.
227 See Grand River Enters. Six Nations Ltd. v. Beebe, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1100 (W.D.
Ark. 2006).
228 See L & H Sanitation, Inc. v. Lake City Sanitation, Inc., 769 F.2d 517, 524 (8th Cir.
1985).
229 See Dreyfus, 114 S.W. at 721.
230 See Massongill v. Cnty. of Scott, 947 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Ark. 1997).
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the delivery of ice “as the business of manufacturing and producing ice is a
business not inherently dangerous to the public welfare or morals.”231  Simi-
larly, in North Little Rock Transportation Co. v. City of North Little Rock, the court
struck down a statute which allowed the only taxicab operating in the city to
receive an exclusive franchise after notice of a finding by the city council that
there was a desire for better service and having sixty days to meet the
requested improvements.232  Here,
[m]erely because it was operating in North Little Rock on June 9, 1939, the
Checker Cab Company received a valuable privilege created at the hands of
the Legislature—and without any legislative finding in the Act, based on sub-
stantial reasoning that an exclusive taxicab business in cities of the first class
was for the public welfare.233
Thus, the grant was unconstitutional.234  The court has further invalidated
occupational licensing regimes for plumbers,235 barbers,236 and a require-
ment for a union label on printing.237
Yet in other cases, the police power analysis is quite deferential.  In
Brown v. Cheney, the Arkansas Supreme Court found that a juke box regula-
tory regime was not in violation of Section 19 and other constitutional provi-
sions.238  First, the court determined that owning and operating a jukebox is
a privilege and not a common right because juke boxes may be harmful—
after all, they are used in “dance halls[ and] drinking places.”239  Then, a
provision of the act which only allows state residents of one year to sustain a
license did not create a monopoly as the legislature gave good reasons for the
requirement.240
In general, Arkansas courts are more likely to apply exacting review to
regulations such as occupational licensing regimes which incidentally create
monopolies.  The best litigation strategies seem to be claims about the valid-
ity of the state’s postured reason for the regulation and the fact that the
chosen regulatory regime is ineffective to achieve the desired ends.
231 Cap F. Bourland Ice Co. v. Franklin Utils. Co., 22 S.W.2d 993, 997 (Ark. 1929).
232 184 S.W.2d 52, 54–55 (Ark. 1944).  The Tennessee court handled a nearly identical
statute similarly. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text.
233 N. Little Rock Transp. Co., 184 S.W.2d at 55.
234 Id. at 56. But see Bridges v. Yellow Cab Co., 406 S.W.2d 879, 880 (Ark. 1966)
(upholding a narrow grant of monopoly—a limousine stand at the airport—after a legisla-
tive finding that there was not enough demand for competitive service to be maintained).
235 See Replogle v. City of Little Rock, 267 S.W. 353, 357 (Ark. 1924).
236 See Noble v. Davis, 161 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Ark. 1942).
237 See Upchurch v. Adelsberger, 332 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Ark. 1960).
238 350 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Ark. 1961).
239 Id. at 186.
240 Id.; see also Potashnick Truck Serv., Inc. v. Mo. & Ark. Transp. Co., 157 S.W.2d 512,
515 (Ark. 1942) (finding that a certificate of public convenience and necessity require-
ment for truck lines did not create a monopoly “nor [did] it intend to permit competition
not required by the public convenience and necessity”).
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F. Georgia (1877)
The General Assembly shall not have the power to authorize any contract or agreement
which may have the effect of or which is intended to have the effect of encouraging a
monopoly, which is hereby declared to be unlawful and void.241
The 1877 version of the provision was similar to today’s but limited to
contracts or agreements with corporations “which may have the effect, or be
intended to have the effect, to defeat or lessen competition in their respec-
tive businesses, or to encourage monopoly; and all such contracts and agree-
ments shall be illegal and void.”242  Additionally, the amendment limited the
General Assembly’s “power to authorize any corporation to buy shares, or
stock, in any other corporation in this State, or elsewhere, or to make any
contract, or agreement whatever, with any such corporation.”243  In the 1945
constitution, the provision was changed to look more like a progressive anti-
trust amendment focused on anticompetitive contracts.244  Then, in the 1976
constitution, the wording was kept the same but with the addition of a sen-
tence authorizing legislative enforcement of the provision.245  In 1983 the
language of the provision was again changed to nearly match the current
version.246
In 2010, Georgia voted on a ballot measure: “[T]o make Georgia more
economically competitive by authorizing legislation to uphold reasonable
competitive agreements?”247  The ambiguously worded measure was
approved by sixty-eight percent, and the current exceptions to the antimono-
poly provision were added essentially to allow for judicial enforcement of
noncompete clauses in employment contracts.248
Setting aside the 2010 amendment, there is not much evidence as to why
the state first included the amendment or why it has been changed and
amended so many times over the years.  In an early case, the Supreme Court
of Georgia held that the provision was meant to restrict the legislature to the
common-law principle against restraints of trade “and thus put it beyond the
241 GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. V(c)(1).  While the provision bans the legislative crea-
tion of monopolies, it further limits the authorization of contracts or agreements that
defeat or lessen competition except for contracts or agreements for activities between
employers and employees, distributors and manufacturers, lessors and lessees, partnerships
and partners, franchisors and franchisees, sellers and purchasers of a business or commer-
cial enterprise, and two or more employees in which the legislature may authorize such
anticompetitive contracts. See id. para. V(c)(2).
242 GA. CONST. of 1877, art. IV, § 2, para. IV.
243 Id.
244 See GA. CONST. of 1945, art. IV, § 4, para. I.
245 See GA. CONST. of 1976, art. III, § 8.
246 See GA. CONST. of 1983, art. III, § 6, para. V(c).
247 Bill Crane, Georgia View: Amending the Constitution, GEORGIA TREND (Apr. 1, 2012),
https://www.georgiatrend.com/2012/04/01/georgia-view-amending-the-constitution/.
248 Id.; see supra note 241 (discussing the exceptions the antimonopoly provision).
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power of the legislature to grant any rights or privileges to corporations
inconsistent with its terms.”249
The applicability of the provision has been severely cabined by Georgia
courts.  First, the provision is “limited expressly to contracts and agreements”
and is interpreted according to a rule of reason where “contracts in partial
restraint of trade are valid if they are reasonable and not injurious to the
public interest; this applies to public-service corporations as well.”250
Whether a contract is reasonable is a question of law for courts to deter-
mine.251  In cases involving government contracts—the most obvious restric-
tion based on a plain reading of the amendment—the court has upheld
contracts as long as the government actor did not abuse their discretion.252
Similarly, in cases involving government contracts for special privileges, Geor-
gia courts have construed the scope of the grant narrowly to avoid finding
the agreement unconstitutional.  In Harrison Co. v. Code Revision Commission,
the court held that the exclusive grant to a publisher to print the official
Georgia code for ten years did not create a monopoly because the plaintiff
could simply publish a competitive product such as a code with annotations
by the Harrison Company.253
The constitutional provision has had teeth in limited circumstances
involving contracts.  In a 1900 case, the court invalidated an ordinance which
required all printing done by the city to contain a union label.254  While it is
not clear if the ordinance was invalidated under the constitutional provision
or under common law, the court made clear that a contract based on an
ordinance that “tended to defeat competition and encourage monopoly”
could not be valid.255  Further, in Georgia Franchise Practices Commission v. Mas-
sey-Ferguson, Inc., the state supreme court invalidated provisions of the
Franchise Practices Act which “may have the effect, or be intended to have
the effect to defeat or lessen competition, or to encourage monopoly.”256
The law required any potential franchisor who wanted to establish a new
franchise in a geographic area where there was an existing franchise of the
same line-item vehicle give written notice to the existing franchise.257  The
249 State v. Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co., 35 S.E. 37, 41 (Ga. 1900).
250 Exec. Town & Country Servs., Inc. v. Young, 376 S.E.2d 190, 192 (Ga. 1989); see also
Ferrero v. Assoc. Materials, Inc., 923 F.2d 1441, 1447–48 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he legisla-
ture may encourage narrowly tailored contracts, which do not unreasonably chill competi-
tion, based upon the legislature’s evaluation of the public interest.”).
251 Exec. Town & Country Servs., 376 S.E.2d at 192.
252 See Exposition Enters., Inc. v. George L. Smith II Ga. World Cong. Ctr. Auth., 338
S.E.2d 726, 729–30 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985).
253 260 S.E.2d 30, 34 (Ga. 1979).  Similarly, in an extremely brief analysis, the court
rejected the claim that a dentistry licensing regime would create a monopoly.  See Wrzesin-
ski v. State, 522 S.E.2d 461, 463 (Ga. 1999).
254 City of Atlanta v. Stein, 36 S.E. 932, 933 (Ga. 1900).
255 Id.
256 262 S.E.2d 106, 107 (Ga. 1979).
257 WMW, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 733 S.E.2d 269, 274 (Ga. 2012) (discussing
Massey-Ferguson).
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existing franchise could then enjoin the new competitor from opening
unless the potential franchisee could demonstrate that the existing franchise
was not adequately serving the public interest.258
In response to Massey-Ferguson, the Georgia Constitution was amended in
1992 to allow the legislature to regulate vehicle franchises.259  After the
amendment, the Georgia legislature reenacted the Franchise Practices
Act.260  While the end result is another weakening of the constitutional pro-
tection against monopoly, Massey-Ferguson does demonstrate that when the
Georgia antimonopoly provision applies, it can be quite powerful.261  In
Georgia, a statute need only restrain trade to be unconstitutional.
Yet a 2017 case demonstrates that this potentially powerful check will
only be used in considerably narrow circumstances.  In Women’s Surgical
Center, L.L.C. v. Berry, the court defined the antimonopoly provision as only
an “anti-competitive contracts clause” which did not apply to a statute requir-
ing a certificate of need for new institutional health services in the state.262
Then, even though the requirement was preventing the Center from enter-
ing into new contracts, the constitutional provision did not apply because
“the requirement does not authorize contracts between service providers or
anyone else that would encourage a monopoly.”263  Thus, the provision only
applies when state contracts affirmatively create a monopoly, rather than
when state action prevents contracts and in effect restricts competition.
G. Wyoming (1889)
Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state, and shall not be
allowed.  Corporations being creatures of the state, endowed for the public good with a
portion of its sovereign powers, must be subject to its control.264
The Wyoming antimonopoly provision was adopted at a time when other
state amendments targeted private monopolies.265  While the language is
258 Id.
259 See id. at 273 & n.3; GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. II (“Notwithstanding the
[antimonopoly provision,] the General Assembly in the exercise of its police power shall be
authorized to regulate . . . new motor vehicle manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and
their representatives doing business in Georgia, including agreements among such parties,
in order to prevent frauds, unfair business practices, unfair methods of competition, impo-
sitions, and other abuses upon its citizens.”).
260 WMW, 733 S.E.2d at 273–74.
261 In American Motors, the North Carolina case upholding a similar franchise law
against an antimonopoly challenge, the court declined to follow Massey-Ferguson because
the Georgia Constitution “concerns legislation having ‘the effect . . . of defeating or lessen-
ing competition . . . ,’ as well as ‘encouraging a monopoly.’”  Am. Motors Sales Corp. v.
Peters, 317 S.E.2d 351, 359 (N.C. 1984) (alteration in original).
262 806 S.E.2d 606, 611 (Ga. 2017).
263 Id.  The court distinguished from Massey-Ferguson because in that case, the provi-
sions of the act struck down authorized franchise agreements which restricted competition.
Id.
264 WYO. CONST. art. I, § 30.
265 See Calabresi & Leibowitz, supra note 14, at 1067.
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written like the older provisions targeting state-granted monopolies, there is
a surprising lack of caselaw under the Wyoming antimonopoly provision.
This may because Wyoming has other provisions that may protect against
crony capitalism like a prohibition on special laws.266  In Pirie v. Kamps, plain-
tiffs challenged a law which required that any legal notice or advertisement
printed to have a certain page size in order to have legal force.267  The claims
were brought under multiple provisions of the Wyoming Constitution includ-
ing the special laws clause and the antimonopoly provision and the Four-
teenth Amendment.268  While the holding was primarily under the special
law provision, the court determined that there was no reason “to give the
publisher of an ordinary and standard newspaper a special privilege over that
granted to the publisher of a tabloid newspaper . . . [and thus t]he provision
of the statute here in question is [unconstitutional].”269
Finally, in a case similar to Pirie, the court found that a law which
required a legal notice or advertisement be printed in a publication that had
been issued at least once a week for fifty-two weeks prior in order to be valid
did not violate the antimonopoly provision.270  There, in a brief analysis, the
court reasoned that “[t]he Legislature has undoubtedly the right, in exercis-
ing the sovereign or police power of the state, to make reasonable regula-
tions in regard to legal notices.”271
For future litigants, there is plenty of space for argument under Section
30.  The best sources of authority would likely be similarly worded antimono-
poly provisions like that of North Carolina and Maryland.
H. Oklahoma (1907)
Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free government, and shall
never be allowed, nor shall the law of primogeniture or entailments ever be in force in
this State.272
The 1907 Oklahoma Constitution was written by farmers concerned with
the threat of monopoly destroying small family farms.273  Populist drafters of
the constitution—a group of land speculators, Native Americans, cowboys,
poor farmers, and coal miners—were primarily concerned with maintaining
“individual ownership of resources, especially of the preservation and
encouragement of individually owned and operated family-style farms.”274  In
266 See, e.g., WYO. CONST. art. III, § 27.
267 229 P.2d 927, 928 (Wyo. 1951).
268 Id.
269 Id. at 932.  The court held that the antimonopoly provision analysis would be the
same as that for the special laws clause. Id. at 930.
270 See In re Gillette Daily J., 11 P.2d 265, 266 (Wyo. 1932).
271 Id. at 268.
272 OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 32.
273 Rennard J. Strickland & James C. Thomas, Most Sensibly Conservative and Safely Radi-
cal: Oklahoma’s Constitutional Regulation of Economic Power, Land Ownership, and Corporate
Monopoly, 9 TULSA L.J. 167, 172 (1973).
274 Id. at 172–73, 190.
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furtherance of this goal, some scholars have noted that the “most important
protection” against economic power was the state antimonopoly provision.275
Yet the antimonopoly provision cannot be understood in isolation.  The
Oklahoma Constitution also empowers the state: “The Legislature shall
define what is an unlawful combination, monopoly, trust, act, or agreement,
in restraint of trade, and enact laws to punish persons engaged in any unlaw-
ful combination, monopoly, trust, act, or agreement, in restraint of trade, or
composing any such monopoly, trust, or combination.”276  The Oklahoma
Supreme Court has held that the provisions should be read together and
thus violations of Section 32 are determined by looking at state antitrust
law—how the legislature has defined monopoly.277  Additionally, in federal
cases interpreting the provision, regulations concerning waste disposal and
telephone lines have been exempt from Section 32.278
The state supreme court has also held that legislation with a real and
substantial relation to the public interest will not be struck down under the
antimonopoly provision.  In Public Service Co. of Oklahoma v. Caddo Electric
Cooperative, the supreme court held that a law prohibiting any electricity sup-
plier from offering to supply electricity in an area already served by a supplier
or which could be served by a supplier by an extension of 500-feet or less did
not violate Section 32.279  After finding that unrestrained competition could
result in an overproduction of electricity, the 500-foot law was justified under
the police power and not in violation of the constitution.280
Under this police-power limitation, Oklahoma courts have upheld regu-
lations and licensing regimes as well.  In Ex Parte Tindall, the court upheld a
licensing regime for vehicles which required a bond but did not allow a cash
bond281 and in Schwarze v. Clark upheld a licensing regime for barbers which
did not allow for students to be paid for services performed at barber school
as reasonable regulations.282  Similarly, the supreme court upheld a require-
ment that licensed abstractors of real estate must have their own set of record
books283 and a dental licensing requirement.284
I. Ohio (2015)
Restraint of trade or commerce being injurious to this state and its citizens, the power
of the initiative shall not be used to pass an amendment to this constitution that
275 Id. at 207.
276 OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 44; see also id. art. IX, § 45.
277 See Rice v. State, 232 P. 807, 811 (Okla. 1924).
278 See S. Disposal, Inc. v. Tex. Waste Mgmt., 161 F.3d 1259, 1264–65 (10th Cir. 1998);
City of Tulsa v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 5 F. Supp. 822, 826–28 (N.D. Okla. 1934).
279 479 P.2d 572, 581 (Okla. 1970).
280 Id. at 579.
281 See 229 P. 125, 133–34 (Okla. 1924).
282 See 107 P.2d 1018, 1020–22 (Okla. 1940).
283 See In re Richardson, 184 P.2d 642, 646 (Okla. 1947).
284 Thrasher v. Bd. of Governors, 359 P.2d 717, 724 (Okla. 1961); see also Cryan v. State,
583 P.2d 1122, 1125 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978).
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would grant or create a monopoly, oligopoly, or cartel, specify or determine a tax rate,
or confer a commercial interest, commercial right, or commercial license to any person,
nonpublic entity, or group of persons or nonpublic entities, or any combination thereof,
however organized, that is not then available to other similarly situated persons or
nonpublic entities.285
The Ohio Constitution explicitly reserves a right for voters to amend the
state constitution.286  In 2015, voters narrowly passed a constitutional amend-
ment which provides the only constitutional limit to future uses of the initia-
tive process.287  Despite the strong wording, the provision is not an absolute
bar to potentially monopoly-creating amendments.288  The Ballot Board is
tasked with determining whether the proposed amendment is in conflict with
the new standards.289  The Board may also decide to put the provision on the
ballot even if it violates the antimonopoly provision by asking:
Shall the petitioner, in violation of division (B)(1) of Section 1e of Article II
of the Ohio Constitution, be authorized to initiate a constitutional amend-
ment that grants or creates a monopoly, oligopoly, or cartel, specifies or
determines a tax rate, or confers a commercial interest, commercial right, or
commercial license that is not available to other similarly situated
persons?290
While this sounds different from other state antimonopoly provisions, the
Ohio Supreme Court has jurisdiction over determinations by the Ballot
Board,291 meaning that the court will ultimately decide when a monopoly is
created—like in other state amendments which limit state action.292  The
Ohio amendment, however, starts out as a limit on private action and the
kinds of referendums citizens can propose.  The end target is a successful
referendum that does not grant monopoly power in the state constitution.
The antimonopoly provision was largely in response to the perception
that the referendum was being bought by powerful special interest groups.
285 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1e(B)(1).  The amendment also provides a protection against
the referendum being used to create unequal tax rates:
The powers defined herein as the “initiative” and “referendum” shall not be used
to pass a law authorizing any classification of property for the purpose of levying
different rates of taxation thereon or of authorizing the levy of any single tax on
land or land values or land sites at a higher rate or by a different rule than is or
may be applied to improvements thereon or to personal property.
Id. § 1e(A).
286 Id. § 1.
287 Steven H. Steinglass, Constitutional Revision: Ohio Style, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 281, 326–27
(2016).
288 Id. at 327.
289 Id.
290 OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1e(B)(2)(a).
291 Steinglass, supra note 287, at 328.
292 But see Ohio Says No to Monopolies: Now What?, CITY CLUB CLEVELAND (Nov. 6, 2015),
https://www.cityclub.org/blog/2015/11/06/ohio-says-no-to-monopolies-now-what
(expressing concern that the amendment may just grant power to a different interest
group: the Ballot Board, but noting that concerns are likely overstated).
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Writing an op-ed supporting the initiative, state representatives remarked
that “we are witnessing the hijacking of the citizen initiative process by cer-
tain rich special interests it is intended to thwart.  Nationally, an entire indus-
try has risen for the purpose of carving out portions of state constitutions for
private gain.”293  The referendum had been used in 2009 to grant a gambling
monopoly to only four locations.294  The issue was approved by only 53% of
the popular vote after $50 million was spent statewide on advertising.295
Codifying these monopolies in the constitution is especially problematic
because even simple changes, like moving one of the casinos, now requires a
new constitutional amendment.296
Interestingly, the 2015 election presented a case study in the kind of
monopoly power the amendment may work to prevent in the future.  While
the antimonopoly provision was Issue 2 on the ballot, Issue 3 on the same
ballot would have actually granted a monopoly.297  The proposal to legalize
recreational and medical marijuana by granting ten companies monopoly
power ultimately failed.298
The Ohio antimonopoly provision is clearly a response to the modern
constitutional innovation of referendums and voter initiatives.  Beyond that,
the amendment demonstrates how the Founders, despite their antimonopoly
spirit, underestimated the risk of special interest groups and crony capital-
ism.299  The fact is that with monopoly profits on the line, corporations are
willing to pay for signature collectors and advertisements.300  Even if political
power is vested in the many, only a few are needed to actually show up and
pass a referendum.  Thus, antimonopoly provisions like Ohio’s protect
against the incentives for crony capitalism that can overpower a democratic
institution.
293 Mike Curtin & Ryan Smith, Opinion, Reps: ‘Yes’ on Issue 2 Says ‘No’ to Monopolies,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Oct. 25, 2015), https://www.cincinnati.com/story/opinion/con-
tributors/2015/10/25/reps-yes-issue-says-monopolies/74599860/.
294 Jim Debrosse, “Buckeye Democracy:” Ohioans Can Amend Their Constitution by Going
Directly to Voters, SOAPBOX CINCINNATI (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.soapboxmedia.com/
features/Civics-Essential-Ohio-Constitutional-amendments.aspx.
295 Id. The amendment was largely promoted as a way to increase jobs and tax reve-
nue—the monopolists have failed to deliver on these promises. Id.
296 Id.
297 Ohio Votes Down Legalizing Pot, Passes Ban on Constitutional Monopolies, WLWT5,
https://www.wlwt.com/article/ohio-votes-down-legalizing-pot-passes-ban-on-constitutional-
monopolies/3559557 (Nov. 4, 2015).
298 Id. It is worth noting that the Ohio marijuana initiative was bankrolled and directed
by the same man who spearheaded the 2009 casino initiative.  Liz Essley Whyte, Ctr. For
Pub. Integrity, How an Ohio Ballot Measure Could Create a Marijuana Monopoly, TIME (June
18, 2015), https://time.com/3921751/ohio-marijuana-ballot-measure/.
299 See supra note 34.
300 For a more detailed explanation of the problems of special interests and referen-
dums, see Whyte, supra note 298.
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CONCLUSION
Current Supreme Court doctrine provides scant protection for eco-
nomic liberty.  This has allowed regulations such as occupational licensing
regimes to run rampant and become a major impediment to economic
growth.  Further, such regulations put the state on the side of one economic
actor over another.  When Justice Brennan called state courts to action in
1977, it is doubtful that he wanted states to take up the cause of economic
liberty.  Yet this Note has demonstrated that many state constitutions are spe-
cifically written with economic protection in mind.  The state antimonopoly
provisions discussed in this Note provide one avenue to challenge regulations
that are arbitrary, unreasonable, or just downright crony.  The discussion in
this Note, however, is only a starting point.  There are countless other unique
state constitutional provisions that can be utilized to provide greater eco-
nomic liberty at the state level.
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